Strategic Design of Recommendation Algorithms

57 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2022 Last revised: 3 Jul 2024

See all articles by Ron Berman

Ron Berman

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Hangcheng Zhao

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Yi Zhu

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management

Date Written: February 6, 2024

Abstract

We analyze recommendation algorithms that firms can engineer to strategically provide information to consumers about products with uncertain matches to their tastes. Monopolists who cannot alter prices can design recommendation algorithms to oversell, i.e., that recommend products even if they are not a perfect fit, instead of algorithmically recommending perfectly matching products. However, when prices are endogenous or when competition is rampant, firms opt to reduce their overselling efforts and instead choose to fully reveal the product's match (i.e., maximize recall and precision). As competition strengthens, the algorithms will shift to demarket their products, i.e., under-recommend highly fitting products, in order to soften price competition. When a platform designs a recommendation algorithm for products sold by third-party sellers, we find that demarketing might be a more prevalent strategy of the platform. Additionally, we find that platforms bound by fairness constraints may gain lower profits compared to letting sellers compete, while discriminatory designs do not necessarily result in preferential outcomes for a specific seller.

Keywords: Product Recommendation, Algorithmic Bias, Bayesian Persuasion, Information Competition, Information Design, Platform Design, Demarketing

JEL Classification: M31, L12, L15, D42, D43, D83

Suggested Citation

Berman, Ron and Zhao, Hangcheng and Zhu, Yi, Strategic Design of Recommendation Algorithms (February 6, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4301489 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4301489

Ron Berman (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Hangcheng Zhao

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Yi Zhu

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://carlsonschool.umn.edu/faculty/yi-zhu

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