'The Devil is in the Details' - Sex Differences in Simple Bargaining Games

31 Pages Posted: 23 Oct 2007 Last revised: 4 Nov 2007

See all articles by Ana Leon-Mejia

Ana Leon-Mejia

Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA)

Luis M. Miller

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics

Date Written: September 25, 2007

Abstract

The study of gender differences in social preferences has shown mixed results, preventing economists and other social scientists from drawing definitive conclusions on this topic. Several original investigations and experimental reviews have hypothesized that the main reason of this heterogeneity of results is the myriad of experimental designs used to study gender differences. In this paper we test this hypothesis by making male and female participants to face two different but related experimental games and two different information treatments. Through this 2x2 factorial design, we obtain results in line with some recent papers: women are sensitive to the design and context of the experiment in ways that men are not. In addition, we go further providing a well-grounded account on the importance of the context for female decision-making.

Keywords: Beliefs, economic experiments, empathy, gender differences, social preferences

JEL Classification: C78, C91

Suggested Citation

Leon-Mejia, Ana and Miller, Luis M., 'The Devil is in the Details' - Sex Differences in Simple Bargaining Games (September 25, 2007). Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2007-069, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1023873 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1023873

Ana Leon-Mejia (Contact Author)

Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) ( email )

C/ Campo Santo de los Mártires, 7
San Bernardo 1010, Caracas, Córdoba 14004
Venezuela

Luis M. Miller

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
153
Abstract Views
2,480
Rank
381,579
PlumX Metrics