Comment on ‘Promises and Partnership’

14 Pages Posted: 12 May 2011

See all articles by Cary A. Deck

Cary A. Deck

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies

Maroš Servátka

Macquarie Graduate School of Management - MGSM Experimental Economics Laboratory

Steven James Tucker

University of Waikato Management School - Economics

Date Written: April 11, 2011

Abstract

Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior of subjects in their experiment is driven by guilt aversion. By modifying the procedures to include a double blind social distance protocol we test an alternative explanation that promise keeping was due to external influence and reputational concerns. Our data are statistically indistinguishable from those of Charness and Dufwenberg and therefore provide strong evidence that their observed effects regarding the impact of communication are due to internal factors and not due to an outside bystander.

Keywords: Experiment, Promises, Partnership, Guilt Aversion, Psychological Game Theory, Trust, Lies, Social Distance, Behavioral Economics, Hidden Action

JEL Classification: C70, C91

Suggested Citation

Deck, Cary A. and Servátka, Maroš and Tucker, Steven James, Comment on ‘Promises and Partnership’ (April 11, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1807422 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1807422

Cary A. Deck

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

Maroš Servátka (Contact Author)

Macquarie Graduate School of Management - MGSM Experimental Economics Laboratory ( email )

Sydney
Australia

Steven James Tucker

University of Waikato Management School - Economics ( email )

Hamilton
New Zealand

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
50
Abstract Views
687
PlumX Metrics