Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament

43 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2003

See all articles by Masaki Aoyagi

Masaki Aoyagi

The University of Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Date Written: May 2003

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament where the agents' effort in each stage gives rise to a stochastic performance signal privately observed by the principal. The principal controls the agents' effort incentive through the use of a a feedback policy, which transforms his private information into a public announcement. The optimal feedback policy is one that maximizes the agents' expected effort. The paper identifies when the principal should use the no-feedback policy that reveals no information, or the full-feedback policy that reveals all his information.

Keywords: tournament, mechanism, information revelation, Jensen's inequality

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JEL Classification: C72, D82

Suggested Citation

Aoyagi, Masaki, Information Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament (May 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=409000 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.409000

Masaki Aoyagi (Contact Author)

The University of Osaka - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8557 (Phone)
+81 6 6878 2766 (Fax)

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