Dependency and Deception in Ultimatum Bargaining

20 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2008

See all articles by Lukas Koning

Lukas Koning

Leiden University

Wolfgang Steinel

Leiden University - Social and Organizational Psychology

Ilja van Beest

University of Amsterdam (UVA), Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences - Communication Science Department

Eric van Dijk

Leiden University

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

In two experiments we studied the relation between dependency and deception in the ultimatum bargaining game. Participants could deceive the other player about the value of the chips they bargained over. Dependency was manipulated by manipulating the consequences of rejecting a proposal for both parties. In one condition the share of the allocator was decreased by 90% when the proposal was rejected, while the share of the recipient was only decreased by 10%. In the other condition these values were reversed. In our first experiment all participants were assigned the role of recipient. Results showed that recipients deceived more often when they were high dependent. This finding was replicated in our second experiment in which participants were either recipient or allocator. Allocators did not deceive more often when they were high dependent, but offered more chips to the recipient instead. The results are discussed in terms of the instrumentality of deception.

Suggested Citation

Koning, Lukas and Steinel, Wolfgang and van Beest, Ilja and van Dijk, Eric, Dependency and Deception in Ultimatum Bargaining (2007). IACM 2007 Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1087363 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1087363

Lukas Koning (Contact Author)

Leiden University ( email )

Postbus 9500
Leiden, 2300 RA
Netherlands

Wolfgang Steinel

Leiden University - Social and Organizational Psychology ( email )

Leiden, 2300 RA
Netherlands

Ilja Van Beest

University of Amsterdam (UVA), Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences - Communication Science Department ( email )

Kloveniersburgwal 48
Amsterdam, 1012 CX
Netherlands
+31(0)20 525 2110 (Phone)

Eric van Dijk

Leiden University ( email )

Postbus 9500
Leiden, 2300 RA
Netherlands

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