In Search of Stars: Network Formation Among Heterogeneous Agents

33 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2005 Last revised: 7 May 2025

See all articles by Jacob K. Goeree

Jacob K. Goeree

University of Zurich

Arno Riedl

Maastricht University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Netspar

Aljaz Ule

University of Amsterdam - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making (CREED)

Abstract

This paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the basic Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing for agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to others. We consider treatments where agents' types are common knowledge and treatments where agents’ types are private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a "star" structure. We find that with homogeneous agents, equilibrium predictions fail completely. In contrast, with heterogeneous agents stars frequently occur, often with the high-value or low-cost agent in the center. Stars are not borne but rather develop: in treatments with a high-value agent, the network's centrality, stability, and efficiency all increase over time. Our results suggest that agents' heterogeneity is a major determinant for the predominance of star-like structures in real-life social networks.

Keywords: heterogeneity, stars, network formation, laboratory experiments

JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92, D01, D85

Suggested Citation

Goeree, Jacob K. and Riedl, Arno M. and Ule, Aljaz, In Search of Stars: Network Formation Among Heterogeneous Agents. IZA Discussion Paper No. 1754, FEEM Working Paper No. 65.2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=822725

Jacob K. Goeree

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/faculty/jgoeree.html

Arno M. Riedl (Contact Author)

Maastricht University ( email )

Department of Microeconomics & Public Economics
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.arnoriedl.com

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Netspar ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Aljaz Ule

University of Amsterdam - Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making (CREED) ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Econometrics
Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

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